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State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and
Other Federal Crimes
Robert A. Mikost

ABSTRACT

The financial crisis has breathed new life into proposals to
reform marijuanalaw. Commentators suggest that legalizingand
taxing marijuana could generate substantial revenues for beleaguered state governments-as much as $1.4 billion for California
alone. This Article, however, suggests that commentators have
grossly underestimated the difficulty of collecting a tax on a drug
that remains illegal under federal law. The federal ban on marijuana will impair state tax collections for two reasons. First, by
giving marijuana distributorspowerful incentives to stay small
and operate underground, the federal ban will make it difficult
for states to monitor marijuanadistributionand, consequently, to
detect and deter tax evasion. In theory, states could bolster deterrence by increasingsanctions for tax evasion, but doing so seems
politically infeasible and may not even work. Second, even if
states could find a way to monitor marijuana distribution effectively (for example, by licensing distributors) such monitoring
could backfire. Any information the states gather on marijuana
distribution could be seized by federal authorities and used to
impose federal sanctions on distributors, giving them added incentive to evade state tax authorities.For both reasons, a marijuana tax may not be the budget panaceaproponents claim it would
be. To be sure, there are reasonablearguments favoring legaliza-
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tion; rescuing states from dire fiscal straits,however, is not one of
them.
INTRODUCTION

Fighting crime is enormously expensive. Federal and state
governments together spend more than $200 billion annually on
criminal justice. 1 Over the past few decades, these expenditures
have ballooned due to the adoption of aggressive new anti-crime
policies, including "three-strikes" sentencing laws and expanded
criminal liability. 2 Some prominent legal scholars have suggested
that the expansion in the scope and severity of the criminal law
might never end-or at least, might never reverse itself-given
the public's seemingly insatiable demand for retribution and
3
safety.
Now, however, fiscal reality is casting doubt on that received
wisdom. With some states teetering on the brink of financial ruin, lawmakers are starting to question whether tough crimefighting measures are really worth their costs. Searching for
ways to cut criminal justice expenditures, state lawmakers have
proposed furloughing prisoners, switching to less costly forms of
4
punishment, and trimming the ranks of police forces.
Even more interestingly, a few states have seriously contemplated legalizing activities long considered criminal, including the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana.
Though marijuana has long been a drain on state budgetsCalifornia alone reportedly spends $156 million annually combating the drug 5 -some state lawmakers are beginning to see it
as a panacea for state budget woes. They hope to ease the strain

1 US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics, table 1.1.2005, online at http;//www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t112005.pdf (visited Sept 30, 2010).
2 Criminal justice expenditures jumped from $36 billion to $204 billion from 19822005. Id.
3 For an insightful discussion of the political dynamics fueling the adoption of everbroader and harsher criminal laws, see William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of
CriminalLaw, 100 Mich L Rev 505, 523-65 (2001).
' See, for example, Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Center on Sentencing and
Corrections, The Fiscal Crisis in Corrections: Rethinking Policies and Practices 4-11
(2009), online at http//www.pewcenteronthestates.orguploadedFiles/Verastate-budgets.
pdfn=5515 (visited Sept 30, 2010) (reporting that at least twenty-six states have cut FY
2010 corrections budgets by, inter alia, releasing prisoners early).
5 California NORML, CA NORML Analysis Finds Marijuana Legalization Could
Yield California $1.5-$2.5 Billion Per Year, online at http;//www.canorml.org/ background/CA legalization.html (visited Sept 30, 2010).
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on their criminal justice budgets-and create a new stream of tax
6
revenue-by legalizing and taxing distribution of the drug.
California, perhaps the most financially distraught of the
states, has been leading the charge to legalize and tax marijuana. 7 Several proposals now under consideration would make the
cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana legal for
adults.8 Proponents suggest the groundbreaking reforms could
save California the estimated $156 million it currently spends
investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and imprisoning recreational marijuana dealers and users. 9 Even more impressively, by
subjecting the drug to a special tax-a $50 levy for every ounce of
marijuana sold-along with the sales tax that applies to all
commodities, the proposal would generate an estimated $1.382
billion in new tax revenue for the beleaguered state. 10 Given that
Californians reportedly produce nearly $14 billion in marijuana
each yearl-and consume much of that in-state-one can hardly
blame lawmakers' enthusiasm for getting a cut of the action.
Indeed, lured by the promise of substantial tax revenues,
nearly 700,000 Californians have signed petitions assuring that
at least one proposal to legalize and tax marijuana (Proposition

6 See David Harrison, Marijuana Bills Tempt Cash-Starved States, Stateline.org
(Apr 5, 2010), online at httpV/www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=474500
(visited Aug 27, 2010); Rob Manning, Oregon Pot Initiative to Start GatheringSignatures,
Oregon Public Radio (Apr 7, 2010), online at http;//news.opb.org/article/oregon-potinitiative-start-gathering-signatures/ (visited Aug 27, 2010).
7 See, for example, Michael B. Farrell, A Marijuana Tax as the Next New Revenue
Stream?, Christian Science Monitor 2 (May 8, 2009) (discussing Governor Schwarzenegger's openness to a debate on legalizing and taxing marijuana); Rebecca Cathcart,
Schwarzenegger Urges a Study on Legalizing Marijuana Use, NY Times A21 (May 7,
2009) (same); Peter W. Brown, Legalize Marijuana-andTax It, SF Chron A12 (May 7,
2009) (urging California to control and tax the sale of marijuana).
8 See, for example, AB 390, Cal Legislature, at 1 (Feb 23, 2009), online at http;//
www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub /09-10/bilasm/ab_0351-0400 /ab_390_bill_20090223_introduced.
html (visited July 29, 2009) (detailing legislative proposal introduced in February 2009);
California Secretary of State, November 2010 Statewide Ballot Measures, online at
http/www.sos.ca.gov/elections/balot-measures/qualified-ballot-measures.htm
(visited
Aug 20, 2010) (describing Proposition 19, a November 2010 ballot initiative that would
legalize marijuana and enable state or local taxation of the drug).
9 California NORML, CA NORML Analysis at 1 (cited in note 5) (summarizing a
study describing the financial benefits of taxing marijuana).
10 California Board of Equalization (BOE), Staff Legislative Bill Analysis, Bill No AB
390, 6 (released July 23, 2009), online at http/www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/ab0390-ldw.pdf
(visited July 29, 2009) (estimating the potential tax revenues that would be generated by
AB 390).
1 Id (reporting how much marijuana California produces each year). See also Jon
Gettman, MarijuanaProduction in the United States, The Bulletin of Cannabis Reform
11 (Dec 2006) (providing state-by-state production estimates).
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19) will appear on the California ballot in 2010.12 The question is
whether legislators and voters are buying a pig in a poke.
This Article suggests that proponents have grossly overestimated the marijuana tax's revenue potential by downplaying, or
simply ignoring, the complexities of enforcing it. In general, tax
proponents and many commentators have assumed the states
could collect a marijuana tax as easily as they collect taxes on
other "sins," such as cigarettes, without grappling with the
unique issues posed by the federal ban. Opponents, by contrast,
have assumed that distributors would necessarily evade the marijuana tax, without explaining why marijuana tax collections
would fare worse than taxes imposed on other sins 13-a particularly egregious omission given that many extant sin taxes exceed
the proposed marijuana tax. On all sides of the debate, commentary largely ignores-or makes undeveloped assumptions
about-the role that federal law would play in state tax collections. Those commentators who have paid heed to the federal
ban seem to agree that federal law poses a barrier to a state marijuana tax, but no one has explained in any depth how or why
this is the case. 14
This Article seeks to fill that analytical void by analyzing the
incentives to evade a state marijuana tax, in light of the enforcement mechanisms proposed by the state and the ignored or
misunderstood wrench thrown into the machine by federal law.
It starts with the standard economic model of tax evasion employed in the tax compliance literature. According to that literature, collecting reliable information on taxable activity is essential to curbing tax evasion. 15 In a nutshell, to stop distributors
12 See Brian Montopoli, Marijuana Legalization Could Be Put to California Voters,
2

CBS News (Dec 15, 2009), online at http/www.cbsnews.con/blogs/2009/1 /15/politics/
politicalhotsheet/entry5981931.shtml (visited Sept 30, 2010).
13 See, for example, George F. Will, Rocky Mountain Medical High, Pittsburgh Trib
Rev (Nov 29, 2009) (arguing that "states attempting to use high taxes to keep marijuana
prices artificially high would leave a large market for much cheaper illegal-unregulated
and untaxed-marijuana," but neglecting to distinguish the states' success at collecting
steep taxes on cigarettes and alcohol).
14 See, for example, Jeffrey A. Miron, The Budgetary Implications of MarijuanaLegalization in Massachusetts 7 (2003) (estimating revenue potential of state marijuana tax
under assumption of federal legalization, but briefly noting that "[ilf the federal government continues to enforce federal marijuana prohibition, the production and sale of marijuana in a legalized state would probably not move from the black market into the legal,
taxed market").
15 See, for example, Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third
PartiesPlay in Tax Compliance, 60 Stan L Rev 695 (2007).
Social norms also play an important role in tax compliance. See generally Eric
Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 Va L Rev 1781 (2000)
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from evading the marijuana tax, states must gather detailed information on their sales; the more information the states gather,
the stronger will be distributors' incentives to pay. The fragmentation of the marijuana market, however, threatens to overwhelm state monitoring of distribution. Thousands of suppliers
now compete in the marijuana market, and the continuing federal ban will thwart consolidation even if California (or any other
state) legalizes marijuana.
What is more, measures that might otherwise facilitate monitoring of a fragmented marijuana distribution system (for example, a distributor licensing system) could easily backfire, since
distribution remains a crime under federal law. States cannot
necessarily block federal authorities from seizing the information
they glean from drug distributors. 16 In many cases, federal law
enforcement officials could use this information to track down
and sanction tax-abiding distributors. The risk that federal authorities could seize data collected by the states gives distributors added incentive, besides the tax, to evade state detection.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some necessary background on proposals to legalize and tax marijuana in
California. It briefly reviews the purposes such a tax might
serve: 1) to force drug users to internalize more of the social
harms arguably caused by drug use and 2) to raise revenues (and
save costs) for state government. Part II analyzes the incentives
that state law alone gives distributors to pay (or not) the marijuana tax. Part III then examines how the federal ban changes
these incentives. The Article concludes that a marijuana tax may
not be the budget panacea many proponents claim. To be sure,
there are reasonable arguments favoring legalization of marijuana; rescuing the states from dire fiscal straits, however, is not
one of them.

(discussing the role of social norms in tax compliance). However, in order to keep my
analyses manageable-and because norms might not bolster compliance with a state
marijuana tax-I do not consider norms separately in this Article. Suffice it to say that
the long-standing prohibition on marijuana under state law-and the ongoing prohibition
under federal law-may have eroded the compliance norm for marijuana-related regulations. After all, the firms that would be first to distribute marijuana in a state-legalized
regime would be accustomed to evading law enforcement.
16 1 explain in more detail why states cannot bar federal access to state records in
Robert A. Mikos, CommandeeringStates' Secrets (unpublished manuscript, 2010) (on file
with author).
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I. BACKGROUND

This Part provides some background information on proposals to legalize and tax marijuana distribution at the state level. Section A briefly discusses the leading proposals under consideration in California. Section B reviews the rationale for imposing a tax on marijuana in lieu of criminal sanctions.
A.

The Proposed Vice Tax

California is once again at the forefront of the marijuana law
reform movement. Advocates have floated several proposals to
legalize and tax marijuana in the state. 17 The particulars vary,
but as a general matter each proposal would legalize the production, distribution, and possession of marijuana by adults. The
state would regulate distribution and production in much the
same way it now regulates the distribution of alcohol and tobacco
products. Namely, it would license distributors and growers and
impose a range of safety-oriented restrictions on them. For example, licensed distributors would be required to take steps to
18
thwart distribution to the underage market.
More interestingly, for present purposes, the state would
impose a special excise tax on the distribution of marijuana.
Most proposals demur on specifying the tax rate, delegating that
decision to state and local agencies, but the leading legislative
proposal calls for a statewide vice tax of $50 per ounce of marijuana in addition to the state's 9 percent retail sales tax. 19 The
combined tax would sum to nearly $70 per ounce, representing a
37% tax rate, based on a projected post-legalization price of
20
around $180 per ounce.
B.

The Virtues of a Vice Tax

The rationales behind imposing a vice tax-especially in lieu
of criminal sanctions-are well known, so I will only briefly
review them here. Imposing a tax on marijuana distribution is
17 One legislative proposal (AB 390) is now in committee; one referendum (Proposition 19) will appear on the 2010 ballot. See note 8.
18 AB 390 § 25405 (cited in note 8).
19 AB 390 § 34011 (cited in note 8). The sales tax rate (9 percent) includes the basic
state sales tax along with various local and special taxes. See BOE, Bill Analysis at 7
(cited in note 10) (detailing the components of a proposed marijuana tax).
20 I calculated the tax rate based on the figures used by the California BOE to estimate tax revenues. See BOE, Bill Analysis at 7 (cited in note 10). My calculation excludes
some compliance costs, such as the cost of figuring out how much tax is owed.
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thought to serve two primary purposes. First, like a criminal
sanction, a tax would force marijuana users to internalize some
of the societal costs of drug use: the accidents, crimes, and emergency-room visits that (arguably) stem from marijuana use.2 1 In
the absence of a tax or criminal sanction, some of these costs
22
would be borne by society at large rather than by users, suggesting that marijuana use would be excessive from a societal
perspective. A tax would help to correct this market failure and
bring marijuana use closer to the socially optimal level, namely,
23
where private benefits most exceed total social costs.
To be sure, from a neoclassical economics perspective, criminal sanctions arguably perform the same function: namely, they
raise the cost of marijuana use and thereby reduce its incidence.
But unlike criminal sanctions, the goal of a tax generally is to
moderate behavior, not eliminate it altogether. More precisely,
the goal of a tax is to ensure that people engage in marijuana use
only when it is efficient to do so, that is, only when the private
24
benefits exceed the social costs.
Second, the tax is supposed to generate substantial revenues
for cash-strapped state governments. State governments already
derive substantial revenues from vice taxes imposed on alcohol
and tobacco products. Tobacco taxes generated more than $16.1
billion for state governments in 2008, and alcohol taxes contributed another $5.3 billion to state coffers. 25 Some estimates suggest that imposing a tax on marijuana sales could dramatically

21 For a balanced review of marijuana's potential harms and medicinal benefits, see
Janet E. Joy, Stanley J. Watson Jr., and John A. Benson, Jr., eds, Institute of Medicine,
Marijuanaand Medicine: Assessing the Science Base 83-136 (National Academy 1999).
Even staunch proponents of legalization acknowledge marijuana use has social costs. See,
for example, Lester Grinspoon and James B. Bakalar, Marihuana:The ForbiddenMedicine 140 (Yale 1993) (acknowledging marijuana plays a role in a large number of accidents).
22 A portion of these harms would be externalized because some injurers would escape detection or would be uninsured/judgment proof.
23 In the lingo of economics, the optimal level of consumption is the point at which
the marginal benefits of consumption (all inclusive) equal the marginal costs (all inclusive).
24 There are, of course, other differences between a tax and criminal sanctions. For a
review, see Dan Kahan, Pecuniary Versus Non-PecuniaryPenalties,in Steven N. Durlauf
and Lawerence E. Blume, eds, 6 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 347-49
(Macmillan 2d ed 2008) (discussing the differences between criminal and civil sanctions).
25 Tax Policy Center, State Tax Collection Sources 2000-2008, online at http/www.
(visited July 29,
taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/state_detailedsource.pdf
2009) (breaking down tax revenues for the federal government and each state according
to the type of tax). Vice taxes are especially appealing during economic recessions because
receipts tend to vary less than those associated with income and general sales taxes.
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increase state vice tax revenues. 26 The California Board of
Equalization (BOE), for example, suggests that legalizing and
taxing marijuana would generate $1.382 billion in new revenue
for California alone 27-more than the state now generates from
alcohol and cigarette taxes combined ($327 million and $1.04
28
billion, respectively).
In a related vein, imposing a marijuana tax in lieu of criminal sanctions (like imprisonment) could also save states millions
(if not billions) of dollars they currently spend on enforcing marijuana prohibition. The basic idea is that it is cheaper to impose
taxes on drug distributors than it is to imprison them. For one
thing, prisons cost upwards of $65,000 per bed to construct; a
tax, by contrast, has no comparable start-up capital expenses. A
prison also costs exorbitant sums to operate-roughly $40,000
per bed annually. To be sure, a tax costs something to enforce;
the state must process tax filings, audit taxpayers, prosecute
evaders, and so on. But on balance, the costs of administering a
tax system are going to be less (possibly far less) than the costs of
administering a criminal justice system. Many constitutional
guarantees that drive up the cost of enforcing law-such as the
right to a government-supplied attorney-apply only to criminal
proceedings; and the burden of proof in establishing criminal liability (beyond a reasonable doubt) is much more onerous for government agents to satisfy than is the burden of proof in establishing tax liability (preponderance of the evidence).
The marginal cost-savings of replacing prohibition with a tax
could be substantial. One estimate suggests that American governments (state and federal combined) spend $10 billion annual26 BOE, Bill Analysis, at 6 (cited in note 10); see also California NORML, CA
NORML Analysis (cited in note 5) (estimating $2 per gram tax and sales tax on marijuana would generate $1.24-$1.4 billion in revenues annually for California). For estimates
of a marijuana tax's revenue potential in other states, see Scott W. Bates, The Economic
Implications of Marijuana Legalization in Alaska (2004) (estimates tax on marijuana
based on cigarette/alcohol taxes would generate $12 million in revenue for Alaska); R.
Keith Schwer, Mary Riddel, and Jason Henderson, Fiscal Impact of Question 9: Potential
State-Revenue Implications 6 (2002) (estimating 30 percent wholesale tax and 7 percent
retail tax on marijuana would generate $28.6 million annually for Nevada). For estimates
of a national marijuana tax's revenue potential, see, for example, Michael R. Caputo and
Brian J. Ostrom, Potential Tax Revenue from a Regulated Marijuana Market, 53 Am J
Econ & Soc 475, 484-85 (1994) (estimating a national tax could generate as much as $5$9 billion annually); Jeffrey A. Miron, The Budgetary Implications of DrugProhibition22
(2008) (estimating national tax based on extant cigarette/alcohol taxes would generate
$6.7 billion annually), online at http/www.econonics.harvard.edu/faculty/miroz/files/
budget_2008.pdf (visited Sept 30, 2010).
27 BOE, Bill Analysis at 7 (cited in note 10).
28 Tax Policy Center, State Tax Collection at 1 (cited in note 25).
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ly enforcing the marijuana prohibition. 29 California alone is
thought to spend roughly $156 million per year on law enforcement directed at marijuana prohibition. 30 Some of that would
need to be redeployed to collect marijuana taxes: for example, to
process filings, and to detect, prosecute, and punish tax evaders.
And California would still need to police other restrictions on
marijuana, such as the continuing prohibition on sales to minors.
The BOE has not yet projected these expenses, but California
currently spends $36 million annually to enforce the state's tax
on cigarettes. 3' Assuming the state would need to spend a comparable sum enforcing the marijuana tax and related restrictions, 32 the marginal cost savings of imposing a tax in lieu of
criminal sanctions would be around $120 million.
It is this financial motive-the prospect of generating new
revenue and shedding expensive criminal-justice costs-that has
recently propelled marijuana law reform into the national spotlight. In the current economic climate, state lawmakers are desperately searching for a budget fix. Collectively, the states faced
$143 billion in deficits in fiscal year 2009, and matters are bound
to get worse; deficits are forecast to grow to $180 billion in 2010,
in spite of all the cuts that states have already made to welfare,
education, and other core programs.3 3 Hence, it is no surprise
that a new proposal to legalize marijuana outright and impose a
tax on all marijuana sales has generated so much genuine inter34
est in California and elsewhere.
Miron, Budgetary Implications at 20 (cited in note 26).
30 California NORML, CA NORML Analysis (cited in note 5).
31 See Governor's Proposed Budget 2010-11, online at http/www.ebudget.ca.gov/
StateAgencyBudgets/0010/0860/department.html (visited Aug 27, 2010) (listing proposed
expenditures on cigarette tax and licensing program). For a comprehensive report on
state expenditures on taxing and regulating alcohol and tobacco, see The National Center
on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, Shoveling Up II: The Impact
of Substance Abuse on Federal,State and Local Budgets 54 (2009), online at httpV/www.
casacolumbia.org/absolutennVarticlefles/380-ShovelingUpII.pdf (visited Aug 27, 2010)
("In 2005, states spent an estimated $5.0 billion to regulate the sale of alcohol and tobacco, issue alcohol and tobacco licenses, collect alcohol and tobacco taxes and for governing
or regulatory bodies. They collected $4.7 billion in alcohol taxes and $13 billion in tobacco
taxes for a total of $17.7 billion.").
32 See discussion below in Part II.C for caveats concerning the comparison between
cigarette and marijuana taxes.
33 Editorial, States in Distress,NY Times A22 (Aug 4, 2009) (estimating state budget
deficit growth in 2010); see also Jennifer Steinhauer, New Year but No Relief for Strapped
States, NY Times Al (Jan 6, 2010) (reporting that state budget problems persist because
of rapidly declining tax collections-10.7 percent drop in third-quarter 2009-and expiration of federal support; California faces $20 billion deficit in FY 2010).
34 Puzzlingly, even if we assume California could generate $1.4 billion in new tax
revenues-a huge assumption, as I demonstrate below-it is not clear that the proposal
29
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To summarize, California has proposed legalizing and taxing
marijuana distribution. The proposal has two goals: 1) to compel
drug users to internalize more of the harms caused by their drug
use; and 2) to generate substantial revenues for the state government and spare it the criminal justice funds currently devoted to enforcing prohibition. One can gauge the success (or failure)
of the tax proposal by the extent to which it serves these two
goals. 35 It is to that task that I now turn.
II. INCENTIVES UNDER STATE LAW

The proposed marijuana tax would serve its ambitious goals
only if the states can collect it.36 If distributors can evade the tax,
the societal harms of marijuana would not be fully incorporated
into the drug's retail price and marijuana consumption would be
excessive from a societal perspective. Likewise, the substantial
revenues being promised by legalization proponents would not
materialize.
Do the proposals give distributors adequate incentives to pay
the tax? Surprisingly, this question has been somewhat neglected in debates over the tax proposal. The California agency that
estimated the tax's revenue potential-in the process, stirring up
so much interest in it-has simply assumed a 100 percent compliance rate when estimating that the tax would generate $1.4
billion in new revenues. 37 Needless to say, perfect compliance is
an optimistic target for any tax. Nonetheless, few lawmakers or
commentators have bothered to question the assumption, focusing instead on other contested issues, such as the size of the tax

would put so much as a dent in California's massive budget deficit. The legislative proposal, for example, would earmark the funds for new drug education and treatment programs. AB 390 (cited in note 6). Though these are no doubt worthy causes, they would not
reduce the state's budget deficit.
35 It may not be possible to serve both goals optimally. A tax designed to maximize
net tax revenues could be higher (or lower) than one designed to correct a market failure.
See Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J Econ Persp
25, 41-45 (2007) (discussing various criteria to consider when deciding upon optimal tax
rates and enforcement policies).
36 Luigi A. Franzoni, Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance, in Boudewijn R.A. Bouckaert
and Gerrit De Geest, Encyclopedia of Law & Economics 52, 55 (Edward Elgar 2008)
("When taxes can be evaded, taxation will prove to be an imperfect tool for pursuing government aims...").
37 BOE, Bill Analysis at 6 (cited in note 10). For example, the BOE cursorily dismisses the notion that consumer production could diminish tax receipts. Id at 7 ("Substantial
home production would clearly have an impact on the revenues generated. Available
research indicates, however, that such production is likely to be minimal."). And the
agency does not even mention possible evasion by commercial distributors.
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base. 38 And the few commentators who have raised compliance
concerns generally have not analyzed them in any depthespecially when those concerns stem from the ongoing federal
39
ban.
This Part begins to explore the neglected compliance issue
by closely examining distributors' incentives to pay (or not) the
proposed marijuana tax. In this Part, I focus exclusively on the
incentives created by state law; in other words, I proceed as if the
federal ban did not exist. In the next Part, I add an additional
layer of complexity and realism and examine how the federal ban
changes distributors' incentives.
Scholars have developed an economic model of tax evasion
based on the seminal work of Gary Becker. 40 In economic terms,
a distributor's decision to pay or evade depends on the relative
costs of each option-the costs of the tax itself (T) versus the expected legal sanctions for evasion (p * S), where p is the probability of detection and S the nominal sanction. 41 A risk-neutral distributor would pay if and only if p * S > T. If the tax exceeds the
expected sanctions (that is, p * S < T), the distributor would
38 See, for example, Michael Hiltzik, Marijuana Valuations in California are
Hallucinations,LA Times B1 (Apr 20, 2009) (claiming "purveyors of statistics about illicit
activity often inflate them-whether to claim legitimacy for the activity, or (if they are
law-enforcement agencies) to frighten voters into supporting funding for more officers,
guns and helicopters"); Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Rand Corporation, Legalizing Marijuana: Issues to Consider before Reforming CaliforniaState Law (2009) (testimony) (criticizing BOE's assumptions concerning, inter alia, size of the tax base), online at http//www.
rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RANDCT334.pdf (visited Sept 30, 2010).
39 See, for example, Bates, Economic Implications in Alaska at 30 (cited in note 26)
(suggesting home production is a potentially large problem; assuming federal legalization); Caputo and Ostrom, 53 Am J Econ & Soc at 486-87 (cited in note 26) (flagging
possible evasion concerns; assuming federal legalization); Miron, Budgetary Implications
(cited in note 26) (assuming federal legalization); Miron, Budgetary Implications in
Massachusetts at 7-10 (cited in note 14) (assuming "minimal" home production and federal legalization; but briefly suggesting a black market would persist barring federal
legalization); Schwer et al, Fiscal Impact (cited in note 26) (implicitly assuming federal
legalization and 100 percent compliance); Will (cited in note 13) (assuming widespread
noncompliance based on proposed level of marijuana tax, but failing to explain why a
marijuana tax would fare worse than sin taxes of comparable or greater magnitude).
40 For helpful discussions of the economic model of tax evasion, see, for example,
Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A TheoreticalAnalysis, 1
J Pub Econ 323 (1972) (creating pioneering economic model of tax evasion); Michael
Doran, Tax Penaltiesand Tax Compliance,46 Harv J Legis 111, 124-25 (2009) (providing
an updated-and accessible-discussion of the economics of tax evasion); Leandra
Lederman, The InterplayBetween Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St
L J 1453, 1463 (2003) (same).
41 There are other costs involved as well. Paying the tax may require additional expenditures, such as figuring out one's tax liability; the same is true of evading the taxdistributors would have to incur expenses to avoid detection, for example, by accepting
only cash transactions. To simplify my analysis, I have ignored these other costs; I doubt
they would change any of my findings.
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evade, thereby creating a tax gap-a discrepancy between taxes
owed and taxes actually paid. The bigger this gap is, the less effective will be the tax at rationalizing marijuana consumption
and raising revenues for the states.
A.

Incentives to Evade

For distributors, the proposed tax represents a cost of doing
business. In a competitive market, distributors would need to
pass this cost on to their customers by raising prices. 42 The tax
being considered by California, for example, would add approximately $70 per ounce-or 37 percent-to the post-legalization
43
retail price of marijuana.
Despite assurances to the contrary, 44 distributors would be
sorely tempted to evade the marijuana tax. A distributor who can
do so gains a substantial competitive advantage vis-a-vis her taxpaying competitors (ignoring, for now, the potential sanctions).
The distributor could exploit this substantial cost advantage by
expanding her profit margins or by poaching customers from her
tax-paying rivals.
B.

Creating Incentives to Pay

The tax rate helps determine the tax gap-the bigger the
tax, the bigger the incentive to evade 45-but it is only half of the
42 See Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven D. Levitt, An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning
Drug Offenders, 88 J Pub Econ 2043, 2051-56 (2004) (demonstrating that increases in the
expected legal sanctions for drug trafficking translate into higher street prices for drugs).
43 See note 20 for an explanation of how to calculate the total tax rate.
44 Interestingly, marijuana distributors and users (the ultimate bearers of the tax)
have been among the most vocal and ardent supporters of taxing-and not just legalizing-marijuana. In California, for example, the Marijuana Policy Project (MPP), a prolegalization group, has launched a pro-tax lobbying campaign organized around the
theme "we want to pay our fair share" and claiming that "millions of Californians" who
use marijuana actually want to pay the tax. Marijuana Policy Project, We Want to Pay
Our Fair Share, online at http/www.mpp.org/states/california/we-want-to-pay-our-fairshare.html (visited Sept 30, 2010) (showing a video of a California marijuana smoker who
wants to pay taxes on the marijuana she consumes). These unusual pleas to be taxed
have seemingly deflected concerns over marijuana tax evasion, but one should always be
skeptical of a professed desire to pay taxes. To be sure, rational marijuana distributors
may genuinely prefer the proposed tax over extant criminal sanctions (assuming, of
course, the tax is lower than the monetized cost of these sanctions), but that does not
mean distributors would necessarily pay the tax if it were adopted.
45 In general, the higher the tax rate, the larger the tax gap will be. Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns, 65 Rev Econ Stat
363, 372 (1983) (concluding that cuts in tax rates can reduce tax evasion); id at 371-72
(estimating that reducing income tax would reduce evasion and increase net tax revenues).
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story. Apart from the tax rate, a distributor deciding whether to
pay or evade must also consider the expected sanction for evasion. If the expected sanction exceeds the tax burden, a distributor would opt to pay the tax and there would be no tax gap problem (at least among rational risk-averse or -neutral distributors).
Under the leading California proposal, for example, a distributor
would pay the tax if (but only if) the expected sanction for evasion exceeds $70 per ounce (the combined cost of the excise and
sales tax).
The expected legal sanction for tax evasion is a function of
the probability of detection (p) and the gross sanction (S) imposed on violators who are detected. In theory, the state government could manipulate either variable (p or S) to achieve optimal
deterrence whereby p * S > T.46 In practice, however, the government's ability to achieve optimal deterrence by imposing legal
sanctions is constrained. Section B. 1 analyzes constraints on the
state's ability to detect tax evasion; Section B.2 analyzes constraints on the state's ability to sanction tax evasion.
1.

Detection.

The state's ability to deter tax evasion rests, in large part, on
its powers of observation-namely, its ability to detect evasion.
But detecting tax evasion is easier said than done. Among other
things, it requires knowing the identity (location, and so on) of
firms 47 that sell marijuana and how much they sell. Without this
information, the government cannot discern which firms have
satisfied their tax obligations. Simply put, in order to detect tax
48
evasion, the state needs to monitor the activity being taxed.
Since the government cannot monitor taxable activity directly-and since it cannot necessarily trust taxpayers' self-reportsit must rely upon knowledgeable and preferably disinterested
third parties (for example, employers) to report taxable activity.
The government commonly relies upon third-party reporting to
obtain the information it needs to enforce tax codes. The federal
46 The level of detection (p) or sanction (S) required for optimal deterrence is a function of the ratio T/S or T/p.
47 I define the term nfirm" expansively to include any individual or entity that distributes marijuana.
48 See, for example, Franzoni, Tax Evasion at 54 (cited in note 36) ("[Elvasion problems originate in the fact that the variables that define the tax base (incomes, sales, revenues, wealth, and so on) are often not 'observable.' That is, an external observer cannot
usually see the actual magnitude of an individual's tax base and hence, cannot know his
true tax liability.").
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Internal Revenue Service, for example, requires employers to
submit periodic reports detailing employees' wages (the W-2).
These reports greatly enhance the ability of resource-constrained
agencies to enforce taxes. Empirical studies have shown, for example, that targeted audits-that is, ones based on leads generated by third party reports-uncover nearly twenty times more
evaded tax (in dollar terms), on average, than do random audits. 49 Indeed, the tax compliance literature has demonstrated
just how important observing taxable activity is to curbing tax
evasion. 50 In general, tax gaps shrink the more information government receives concerning taxable activity. Consider federal
income taxes. The IRS estimates on average that 16 percent of
federal income taxes go unpaid,5 1 but the gap varies considerably
by source of income. In particular, the gap is estimated to be
much larger for income sources the IRS cannot easily monitor,
such as farm income (72 percent gap), self-employment income
(52 percent), and income from royalties and rents (51 percent)52
the IRS cannot rely upon third parties to report such income.
By contrast, the gap is estimated to be smaller for income the
IRS can observe through third party reporting: the gap is only 1
percent for salary income (reported on W-2s) and 4 percent for
3
dividend income (reported on form 1099).5
49 James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J Econ
Lit 818, 843 (1998).
50 Lederman, 60 Stan L Rev at 698 (cited in note 15) ("Information reporting and
withholding extend to a variety of types of income in the U.S. and are highly successful at
securing compliance."). See also Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of
Regulating Behavior, 100 Nw U L Rev 655, 675-78 (2006) (emphasizing the key role of
structure-including information reporting programs-for tax compliance); Mark J. Mazur and Alan H. Plumley, Understandingthe Tax Gap, 60 Natl Tax J 569, 570-76 (2007)
(emphasizing the key role of third-party reporting in explaining tax compliance); Slemrod,
21 J Econ Persp at 44-45 (cited in note 35) (same).
51 Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap Facts and Figures 3, online at http//www.irs.
gov/pubfrs-utVtax gapfacts-figures.pdf (visited Sept 30, 2010).
52 Slemrod, 21 J Econ Persp at 28 (cited in note 35) (reporting IRS figures).
53 Id (reporting IRS figures); see also id at 39 (suggesting that third-party reporting
enhances compliance).
State use taxes provide another telling example of the need to observe taxable
activity. The use tax is a substitute for the state sales tax; it applies to purchases of goods
to be consumed in-state, even though the goods were bought out-of-state (or online).
States have failed (miserably) in collecting use taxes on online purchases of common
consumer goods, like CDs; by some estimates, the tax gap for such online purchases is 90
percent, a staggering figure. See Donald Bruce and William F. Fox, E-Commerce in the
Context of Declining State Sales Tax Bases, 53 Natl Tax J 1373, 1380, 1380 n 20 (2000)
(assuming a 90 percent tax gap). A number of factors, including the massive volume of
online transactions, the huge number of online vendors, and the states' limited authority
over out-of-state vendors, severely constrain the states' ability to monitor online transactions. Id (also noting that ignorance of the tax contributes to noncompliance). By contrast,
the states have succeeded at collecting use taxes on automobile purchases, online or oth-
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To illustrate how third-party reports enhance governments'
powers of observation, suppose a government agency is responsible for overseeing one hundred thousand individual taxpayers.
One of them, Azure, submits a tax return reporting $50,000 in
wage income for 2008. If the agency has no means of verifying
Azure's income (for example, no W-2) it would have no way of
knowing whether Azure has satisfied her obligations or even
whether she should be scrutinized more closely than any other
taxpayer (out of 99,999). The agency must allocate its scarce enforcement resources at random, for example, by auditing one out
54
of every fifty taxpayers-a costly and unproductive approach.
However, if the agency has credible information regarding taxpayer income, it can focus its limited resources investigating only
those taxpayers who (likely) underreported their tax obligations,
thereby enhancing the probability of detection. For example,
suppose that Azure's employer, Acme Corporation, had submitted a W-2 to the agency indicating that it had paid Azure
$100,000 in wages throughout 2008. The agency need only compare the income on the W-2 to the income Azure reported on her
tax return to spot an obvious case of evasion worthy of further
investigation.
Given how crucial monitoring is for enforcing other taxes, it
seems reasonable to suppose California would likewise need to
monitor marijuana distribution in order to deter evasion of the
proposed marijuana tax. In particular, California would need to
observe 1) who sells marijuana and 2) how much is sold. The
former observation identifies who owes the marijuana tax; the
latter observation establishes how much they owe. Holding all
else constant, the more complete are California's data on these
two matters, the smaller the marijuana tax gap will be.

erwise; scholars suggest the tax gap for such transactions is nominal, and it is easy to see
why. It is comparatively easy for government to observe automobile purchases, in large
part, because several parties have a strong incentive to report transactions. For example,
to perfect a security interest in an automobile, a lender must acquire a certificate of title
from the state. And to drive a car legally, a buyer must register it with the state.
54 Posner, 68 Va L Rev at 1784 (cited in note 15) (reporting that only 2 percent of
taxpayers are typically audited in any given year).
Many random audits would not reveal wrongdoing, both because many audited
taxpayers have fully paid their taxes and because the auditor might not spot any wrongdoing-after all, the government would need to rely upon records provided by the taxpayer him / herself (bank accounts, etc.) to try to verify wage income. For a helpful discussion
of the literature regarding the relative utility of selective auditing, see James Andreoni,
Brian Erard, and Jonathon Feinstein, 36 J Econ Lit at 820 (cited in note 49) (reporting
that, on average, a nonrandom audit yields more than $5.5 thousand in additional assessments, versus only $289 for a random audit).
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This begs the question: is there any way for California to
reliably monitor marijuana distribution? After all, marijuana
prohibition has been so costly and (arguably) ineffective largely
because of the difficulty of observing the production and distribution of this ubiquitous weed.5 5 Nonetheless, advocates have proposed a promising solution: a licensing system for the distribution and production of marijuana that would (arguably) enhance
tax monitoring. 56 Under this system, distributors would need a
state-issued license to distribute marijuana legally. As a condition of holding such license, distributors would be required to
maintain business records detailing sales (among other things)
and periodically submit such records to the state's licensing
authority (also its taxing authority). Producers would be subject
to similar licensing, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements.
States commonly employ such licensing systems to assist collection of other vice taxes.
A licensing system could bolster evasion detection in two
main ways. First, California could use the system to limit the
number of firms distributing marijuana, and hence, the number
of firms the state would need to monitor. By limiting the number
of distribution licenses, California would ensure that its "administrative resources [would] not be swamped by the necessity of
overseeing thousands of extremely minor operations." 57 Second,
by compelling licensees to reports sales (among other things), the
system would help generate the data the state needs to review
tax compliance-for example, a licensee's sales records could be
used to estimate its tax base.
To be sure, the licensing system is not a panacea. For one
thing, the system could be circumvented. Consumers could bypass commercial distributors altogether and grow their own supplies. After all, compared to tobacco, 58 marijuana is relatively
55 See, for example, Kevin B. Zeese, Drug War Forever?, in Melvyn B. Krauss and
Edward P. Lazear, eds, Searching for Alternatives: Drug-Control Policy in the United
States 254 (1991) (suggesting government efforts to eradicate marijuana supplies have
been futile).
56 AB 390 at 2 (cited in note 8). See Jim Leitzel, Regulating Vice 161-63 (Cambridge
2008), for a helpful discussion of the utility of licensing.
57 Leitzel, Regulating Vice at 162 (cited in note 56). Interestingly, there is no
indication California even aspires to limit the number of licensees, see AB 390 (not limiting the number of licenses issued) (cited in note 8), so this is giving the state the benefit
of the doubt.
58 For starters, the tobacco plant itself is very large (six feet plus) and temperamental. John Hanna, Agricultural Cooperationin Tobacco, 1 L & Contemp Problems 292, 294
(1934) (describing the cultivation of tobacco). The seeds must be started in nursery beds
and then transplanted to fields. Id. Once the crop is established, it requires "assiduous
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easy to cultivate and process-it costs roughly $100 to get started 59 and for the horticulturally challenged, there are even numerous "idiot's guide"-type books to show the way. 60 And California could not feasibly license or tax home-grown marijuana, any
more than it could license or tax home-grown tomatoes. Alternatively, consumers could patronize black market (unlicensed) distributors. By evading the tax, such distributors could offer consumers a steep price discount. One illustrative survey of New
York cigarette smokers found that 37 percent admitted to buying
cigarettes from non-taxed sources. 6 1 Of course, most consumers
would presumably opt for the safety and convenience of licensed
marijuana distributors. But even those licensed distributors
could evade taxes by underreporting sales. The third parties best
situated to detect tax evasion-customers-are highly unlikely to
report it, since they usually gain by it (via lower prices). To be

sure, rival distributors, suppliers, and undercover buyers could
catch and report some evasion, keeping most licensees tolerably
honest. In other words, the licensing system should help, but it is
hardly foolproof; some portion of marijuana tax evasion would
undoubtedly escape detection.
2.

Sanctions.

In theory, even if California cannot observe marijuana distribution reliably and detect all instances of evasion, it could still
achieve optimal deterrence by imposing harsh sanctions on the
tax evaders it does apprehend. To illustrate, to compensate for a
very low probability of detection (say, p = 10 percent), California
care" and "personal attention to each plant in the field," in effect waging "a never ending
war with nature." Id. The process of harvesting the tobacco leaves is fatiguing and protracted. Id. Once the leaves are harvested-large, broad, and delicate leaves, usually
about two feet long-they must be cured, sometimes fermented, and aged in large wooden
barns with slats in a process that takes up to, and sometimes over, one year. Id.
While tobacco can be grown anywhere, even the same plant variety will vary widely in quality depending on the soil and climate in which it is grown. Id. As a result, tobacco production in the US is highly concentrated geographically. Id. North Carolina and
Kentucky together account for 65 percent of total US production with Tennessee,
Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia accounting for another 25 percent. Lawrence E.
Wood, The Economic Impact of Tobacco Production in Appalachia 1 (Appalachian
Regional Commission 1998).
59 Steve Fainaru and William Booth, CartelsFace an Economic Battle, Wash Post Al
(Oct 7, 2009) ("With a $100 investment in enriched soil and nutrients, almost anyone can
cultivate a plant that will produce two pounds of marijuana that can sell for $9,000.").
60 A search on Google.com on Jan 9, 2010 for "idiot's guide to growing marijuana"
reveals numerous guides to growing marijuana.
61 New York State Department of Health, CigarettePurchasingPatterns among New
York Smokers: Implicationsfor Health, Price,and Revenue 15 (2006).
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could impose a sanction multiplier (T / p), to boost expected sanctions to the level needed to deter evasion (p * (T / p) = T). In this
case, where p = 10 percent, sanctions would need to be 1,000 percent of the tax originally due. In fact, economists generally prefer
this option-namely, a high sanction paired with a low rate of
detection-because it is cheaper to impose more severe sanctions
(especially monetary sanctions) than it is to catch more criminals .62

As it stands, however, the sanctions for tax evasion are too
low to compensate even for small gaps in detection. In California,
the sanction for intentionally evading taxes is only 125 percent of
the original tax burden (plus interest), that is, 1.25T. 63 The same
is true in most jurisdictions; in fact, legal scholars have frequently called attention to the low level of sanctions imposed for tax
evasion. 64 In our example above, where p equals 10 percent, the
expected legal sanction a distributor would face per dollar of tax
evaded in California is only about a dime ($0.125)-not nearly
enough to deter risk-neutral distributors from evading.
Assuming its capacity to detect evasion is limited, as I have
already shown, California would need to raise its sanctionsperhaps dramatically-in order to curb evasion. Such a strategy,
however, is fraught with shortcomings. First, adopting substan65
tial sanctions multipliers might not be politically feasible. It
seems politicians do not want to appear as though they are empowering tax enforcement agencies (even for the greater good).
And as a legal matter, the Eighth Amendment and like-minded
provisions found in state constitutions could bar imposition of
the sort of draconian fines that might be needed to deter tax evasion. 66 What is more, a substantial sanction multiplier is more
62 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, J Pol Econ 169,
184 (1968). The gross sanction (S) necessary to achieve optimal deterrence is simply the
tax due divided by the probability of detection, T/p.
63 West's Ann Cal Rev & T Code § 30205.
64 See, for example, Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51
Kansas L Rev 971, 973 (2003) (remarking that penalties for tax evasion are generally
only 20-75 percent of unpaid tax); Posner, 86 Va L Rev at 1783 (cited in note 15) (same).
65 See, for example, Doran, 46 Harv J Legis at 130-31 (cited in note 40) (suggesting
that raising the sanction for and/or probability of detection of tax evasion to the level
required to achieve optimal deterrence is not politically feasible); Lederman, 64 Ohio St L
J at 1466 (cited in note 40) (concluding that "it is not politically realistic for the government to impose extremely high monetary penalties for tax evasion and the government
does not do so").
Interestingly, AB 390 is mum on specifics when it comes to sanctions for evasion.
66 Though the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment is considered weak, it
does establish an outer limit on the severity of fines states may impose. United States v
Bajakajian,524 US 321, 344 (1998) (invalidating, on Excessive Fines grounds, forfeiture
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likely to be deemed "punitive" for purposes of constitutional
analysis, a determination that could raise the cost of imposing
the sanction and collecting the tax, thereby detracting from its
67
appeal.
Second, even assuming high sanction multipliers could be
adopted, the government's ability to impose them is constrained. 68 Perhaps most importantly, offender wealth establishes a de facto ceiling on the maximal financial sanction. 69 To the
extent it exceeds offender wealth, a monetary fine contributes
nothing to deterrence. And there is no reason to assume that marijuana distributors who evade taxes could necessarily afford to
pay fines several times larger than the taxes evaded. Indeed,
since a portion of the taxes they evaded presumably would have
been passed onto their consumers (as price discounts), distribu-

tors would not even necessarily be able to pay their original tax
burden if caught, much less several times (in our example, 10x)
that burden. 70 Thus, despite the sound theoretical argument
suggesting that high sanctions should deter evasion, empirical
studies generally have failed to demonstrate that raising sanctions actually deters evasion. 71 In any event, it is worth noting
of $357,144 in cash, which the defendant had attempted to remove from the United
States without filing appropriate reports).
67 Once the Court determines that the sanction is punitive (versus civil), the constitutional guarantees of criminal procedure generally apply. See Kennedy v MendozaMartinez, 372 US 144, 168-69 (1963) (distinguishing criminal from civil sanctions).
6s For literature examining the limitations and drawbacks of maximal sanctions, see,
for example, Lucian A. Bebchuck and Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals
Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probabilityof Apprehension, 21 J Legal Stud 365, 365
n 2 (1992) (surveying justifications for use of non-maximal sanctions). For scholarship
analyzing the limitations and drawbacks of maximal sanctions for tax evasion specifically, see, for example, Franzoni, Tax Evasion at 62-63 (cited in note 36) (suggesting that
taxpayer wealth, fairness concerns, and the increasing costs of enforcing ever-harsher
sanctions counsel against imposing maximal sanctions for tax evasion).
69 See Franzoni, Tax Evasion at 18 (cited in note 36) ("From a practical point of view,
the major impediment to infinite fines derives from taxpayers' limited wealth."). The
analysis could be extended to other types of sanctions; for example, the offender's expected lifespan would establish an effective ceiling on the maximal incarceration sanction.
70 Even if the price reflects the expected sanction, the distributor who is caught
would not necessarily be able to afford the gross sanction.
71 Franzoni, Tax Evasion at 60 (cited in note 36) ("Studies based on IRS data provide
a picture of the compliance phenomenon in which many factors come into play: income
source, socioeconomic grouping (age, sex, location), detection probability, marginal tax
rate and income level. Notably, the severity of the sanction does not seem to play a significant role (partly because in the US sanctions are rarely inflicted)."); Slemrod, 21 J Econ
Persp at 38 (cited in note 35) ("[Tjhere has been no compelling empirical evidence addressing how noncompliance is affected by the penalty for detected evasion, as distinct
from the probability that a given act of noncompliance will be subject to punishment.")
(emphasis omitted).
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for prohibition-that is, the
seeking to abandon. And if
bolstered compliance with
question whether it would
either.

The Tax Gap (Version 1)

From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that
California (or any other state) would collect less than 100 percent
of the marijuana tax due. The state cannot reliably observe marijuana distribution, suggesting the probability of detecting tax
evasion (p) would be low. Moreover, the state cannot necessarily
compensate for the gap in detection by raising sanctions for evasion. A marijuana tax gap will exist; the question is, how big
would the gap be? There is no way to tell, precisely, because
there are too many unknowns. At the same time, however, because it could alter the fate of proposed reforms, the gap should
not be ignored. Hence, it seems prudent to hazard an estimate of
the tax gap, even if it is necessarily rough.
To that end, this Section proposes to estimate the marijuana
tax gap (roughly) by comparing that tax to the analogous cigarette tax. The cigarette tax provides a useful starting point for
estimating the marijuana tax gap for at least two reasons. First,
we have ample data and experience concerning the cigarette tax
gap. Cigarette taxes have existed for decades and numerous
quantitative studies have examined compliance with them. 72 In
other words, at least this starting point is on reasonably firm
ground. Second, the cigarette tax compliance data should be informative because the systems used for enforcing that tax and
the marijuana tax are so similar. In fact, the marijuana licensing
system (discussed above) is modeled on the cigarette licensing
system currently employed by California and other states, and
72 For a sampling of the literature, see, for example, Benjamin Alamar, Leila
Mahmoud, and Stanton A. Glantz, Center for Tobacco Control, Research and Education,
Cigarette Smuggling in California: Fact and Fiction (2003); BOE, Revenue Estimate:
Cigarette and Tobacco Products Tax Evasion (2007); Matthew C. Farrelly, Christian T.
Nimsch, and Joshua James, Tobacco Technical Assistance Consortium, State Cigarette
Excise Taxes: Implications for Revenue and Tax Evasion (2003); General Accounting Office, CigaretteSmuggling: Federal Law Enforcement Efforts and Seizures Increasing(May
2004); New York State Department of Health, Cigarette PurchasingPatterns (cited in
note 61); Stephen D. Smith and Van Huynh, Washington State Department of Revenue,
Washington State Cigarette Consumption Revisited (2007); Mark Stehr, Cigarette Tax
Avoidance and Evasion, 24 J Health Econ 277 (2005); Jerry G. Thursby and Marie C.
Thursby, Interstate CigaretteBootlegging: Extent, Revenue Losses, and Effects of Federal
Intervention, 53 Natl Tax J 59 (2000).
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the very same agency-the BOE-would administer both systems in California. Needless to say, this comparison is imperfect-the taxes and markets on which they are imposed differ in
important respects, as I explain below; nonetheless, the two taxes and markets are similar enough such that the comparison
should shed some light on the potential magnitude of the compliance problem California would face.
So what do the studies of cigarette tax compliance show? Not
surprisingly, the findings vary from study to study, based on a
number of crucial factors, including: 1) what counts as "eva74
sion";73 2) the methodology used to estimate black market sales;
and 3) the time period studied. 75 Nonetheless, despite their variations, one can glean from these studies a reasonable consensus
concerning the range of possible cigarette tax gaps. According to
national studies, the tax gap across all jurisdictions on average
ranges between 7.2 percent and 12.7 percent-a small, but nonnegligible level. 76 Not surprisingly, the range among individual

jurisdictions is much larger, due to the substantial variation in
the tax rate across jurisdictions. (In 2009, for example, state tax
rates varied from $.07 per pack in South Carolina to $3.46 per
pack in Rhode Island. 77) Studies report tax gaps ranging from 1

percent in the lowest tax states to more than 24 percent in the
highest tax states, though studies that focus on smaller jurisdic-

73 Some studies define tax evasion expansively to include any purchase made without
payment of a cigarette tax, see, for example, Stehr, 24 J Health Econ at 295 (cited in note
72) (examining all non-taxed sales), whereas other studies examine only certain forms of
evasion, such as commercial smuggling, see, for example, Thursby and Thursby, 53 Natl
Tax J at 69 (cited in note 72) (focusing on commercial smuggling).
74 Most studies estimate (in varying ways) actual consumption and compare that to
taxed consumption, see, for example, Stehr, 24 J Health Econ 277 (cited in note 72), but
some studies rely on other methods, such as direct surveys of smokers, see, for example,
New York State Department of Health, CigarettePurchasingPatterns(cited in note 61).
For a brief review of some of the studies and methodologies used, see Smith and Huynh,
Washington State CigaretteConsumption at 44-45 app. III (cited in note 72).
75 The time period is crucial because the tax rate-and the differential across
states-has increased over time. See Tax Foundation, State Sales, Gasoline, Cigarette,
and Alcohol Tax Rates by State, 2000-2009, online at http;//www.taxfoundation.org/files/
state various sales rates-20091006.xls (visited Aug 27, 2010) (providing state-by-state
tax-rate data from 2000-2009).
76 Stehr, 24 J Health Econ at 280 (cited in note 72) (estimating average tax gap
across states for 1985 (7.2 percent), 2001 (12.7 percent), and 1985-2001 (9.6 percent).
Stehr's estimates are consistent with other national studies. See Thursby and Thursby,
53 Natl Tax J at 69 (estimating 4.71-7.3 percent tax gap due to commercial smuggling);
Ayda A. Yurekli and Ping Zhang, The Impact of Clean Indoor-Air Laws and Cigarette
Smuggling on Demand for Cigarettes:An Empirical Model, 9 Health Econ 159, 168 (2000)
(estimating 6 percent average tax gap due to smuggling in 1995).
77 Tax Foundation, State Sales (cited in note 75).
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78
tions (such as New York City) have reported even larger gaps.
California's tax gap appears to fall in the mid-range-around 15
79
percent in FY 2005-06 (the most recent estimate available). It
is worth noting that at the time of this estimate, California's excise tax was 87 cents per pack and the federal excise tax was 37
cents per pack-together they added about 45 percent to the retail price of cigarettes, roughly in line with the proposed marijuana tax rate.
The studies generally attribute the cigarette tax gap to 1)
sales made by black market (unlicensed) vendors, 2) sales made
by licensed vendors that go unreported, and 3) crossjurisdictional smuggling by consumers80
Using the cigarette tax gap to estimate the probable marijuana tax gap is, of course, subject to important caveats. On the
one hand, the marijuana tax gap could be smaller than the cigarette tax gap. First, cigarette taxes are, on average, substantially

higher than the proposed marijuana tax. On average, cigarette

taxes currently add $2.35-or 84 percent-to the retail price of
cigarettes;8 1 the leading marijuana tax proposal, by contrast,
would add "only" 37 percent to the price of the drug. The higher
tax burden presumably gives cigarette distributors and consumers a stronger incentive to cheat the system. It is worth noting,
however, that many of the empirical studies discussed above ex-

78 Stehr, 24 J Health Econ at 295 (cited in note 72) (finding that tax gap varied from
less than 1 percent in lowest tax states to nearly 19 percent in highest tax states). See
also Smith and Huynh, Washington State CigaretteConsumption at 28 Table 11 (listing
estimated non-taxed sales rates by state) (cited in note 72).
For studies of individual jurisdictions, see, for example, BOE, Revenue Estimate at
2 (cited in note 72) (estimating cigarette tax gap in California at 14.9 percent in FY 200506); Smith and Van Huynh, Washington State CigaretteConsumption at 12 (cited in note
72) (estimating Washington state tax gap at 24 percent); New York State Department of
Health, CigarettePurchasingPatternsat 15 (cited in note 61) (surveying New York smokers and finding that 37 percent buy cigarettes from non-taxed sources "some or all of the
time," costing state estimated $419-$552 million annually).
79 BOE, Revenue Estimate at 2 (cited in note 72) (calculated as ratio of non-taxed
sales-209 million packs-to total consumption-1,399 million packs).
80 BOE, Revenue Estimate at 2 (cited in note 72) (apportioning gap to casual smuggling by consumers and smuggling by retailers); Stehr, 24 J Health Econ at 295 (cited in
note 72) (attributing tax gap to smuggling, internet sales, sales at reservations, and crossborder purchases by consumers). See also General Accounting Office, Cigarette Smuggling: Federal Law Enforcement Efforts and Seizures Increasing 5-6 (2004) (describing
methods of evasion: 1) international smuggling; 2) cross-state smuggling; 3) using counterfeit tax stamps; and 4) falsifying distribution reports); Thursby and Thursby, 53 Natl
Tax J at 60-61 (cited in note 72) (discussing types of evasion).
81 Eric Lindblom, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates
& Rankings (Oct 12, 2009), online at http/tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/
0097.pdf (visited Sept 30, 2010) (listing cigarette excise tax rates in all 50 states).
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amined cigarette tax rates when they were more in line with the
marijuana tax rate now under consideration.
Second, cross-jurisdictional smuggling arguably puts a bigger dent in cigarette tax collections than it would in marijuana
tax collections, due to the enormous variance in cigarette tax
rates across jurisdictions. As mentioned earlier, cigarette taxes
vary from as little as $.07 per pack to $3.46 per pack across the
United States-and the variation increases when local taxes are
considered. Not surprisingly, jurisdictions that impose comparatively high taxes on cigarettes suffer comparatively large tax
gaps due to smuggling.8 2 In New York City, for example, where
cigarette taxes are among the highest in the nation-$4.25 per
pack, including the state levy-an estimated 75 percent of cigarettes consumed by residents are bought somewhere else (that is,
83
a lower-tax jurisdiction).
California is unlikely to experience smuggling from other
states because its marijuana tax, though steep, is still (much)
smaller than the criminal sanctions imposed elsewhere (at least
for now). In fact, one might expect growers to migrate to
California and then smuggle marijuana elsewhere, in order to
take advantage of California's comparatively hospitable laws.
On the other hand, the marijuana tax gap could be larger
than the cigarette tax gap. First, the cigarette market is far more
concentrated than the marijuana market is (or will be, anytime
soon). As it stands, three firms manufacture more than 85 percent of all cigarettes consumed in the United States.8 4 As discussed above (and below), such market concentration greatly enhances government's ability to monitor tax compliance-for example, it is easier to supervise a small number of large
producers/distributors than a large number of small ones. The
marijuana market, however, is highly fragmented-thousands of
85
small distributors compete on the market in California alone.
The fragmented structure of the marijuana market would pre-

82 See, for example, Daniel T. Brown, Economic Impact of Increasing the Delaware
Cigarette Tax 2 (June 2009), online at http//128.175.63.72/projecW'DOCUMENTS/
HB211fmal v4.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (finding that nearly two-thirds of cigarettes purchased in Delaware are exported to neighboring states, where taxes can be as much as $3
higher per pack).
83 Cigarette Tax Burnout, Wall St J A14 (Aug 11, 2008) (discussing how high state
cigarette taxes often cause cigarettes to be purchased out of state).
84 Wei Tan, The Effects of Taxes and Advertising Restrictionson the Market Structure
of the U.S. CigaretteMarket, 28 Rev Indust Org 231, 232 (2006) (market data as of 2000).
85 See below Part III.B.
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sumably exacerbate the marijuana tax gap in comparison to the
cigarette tax gap.
Second, personal cultivation would put a bigger dent in marijuana tax collections, due to the relative ease of growing marijuana.8 6 Almost no one grows tobacco for personal consumption;
the plant is temperamental, geographically sensitive, and even
somewhat dangerous to handle. In addition, it takes nearly one
year to cure tobacco leaves for consumption. By comparison, marijuana is quite easy to grow at home. Hence, a consumer might
grow her own marijuana to evade a 37 percent tax even if she
would not grow her own tobacco to circumvent an 84 percent tax.
Despite these differences, the tobacco cigarette and marijuana markets and taxes seem similar enough such that-with the
aforementioned caveats in mind-we can gauge, albeit only
roughly, what sort of impact evasion might have on the value of
the proposed marijuana tax. In particular, if we assume that
California would experience a gap in line with the national average for all state cigarette taxes-a range of 7.2 percent to 12.7
percent-evasion would reduce marijuana tax revenues by $100
million to $176 million annually compared to extant BOE estimates. If a higher estimate of the tax gap is used-namely, one
based on California's own cigarette tax gap (14.9 percent)-the
state would lose $206 million to evasion. A final basis of comparison could be the cigarette tax gap suffered by the state of
Washington. Analysts have studied Washington closely and have
found it to have one of the highest tax gaps of any state: 24 percent. California would lose $332 million if Washington's tax gap
applied.

86 Compare Bates, Economic Implications in Alaska (cited in note 26); Caputo and
Ostrom, 53 Am J Econ & Soc at 487 (cited in note 26) (noting that since marijuana is
easier to produce than alcohol, 'it is likely that a larger proportion of marijuana will be
grown at home than the proportion of alcohol produced in homes in the 1930s.").
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Table 1. Projected marijuana tax gap and revenues lost ($ millions) under varying scenarios
Scenario
California
cigarette
87
tax gap
Average
cigarette tax
gap across
88
United States
Washington
cigarette
tax gap 8 9

High

Midpoint
14.9%
($206)

Low

12.7%
($176)

9.6%
($133)

7.2%
($100)

24%
($332)
($332)

Table 1 displays the three basic tax gap scenarios, including
ranges. The cells display estimates of the revenue that would be
lost under each scenario, based on the BOE's estimate that the
California tax would generate $1.382 billion in new revenue assuming no evasion. It should be noted, however, that the revenue
loss figures could be adjusted even if the BOE's estimate of the
tax base-namely, 19.8 million ounces consumed at a value of
$3.58 billion-is incorrect.
While these are substantial losses, it seems unlikely that
they would significantly reduce public support for reform even
among citizens who care only about the financial implications of
the proposals. After all, assuming the BOE's tax base figure is
reasonable-a BIG assumption-the proposals would still generate $1.050-1.286 billion in new tax revenue, in addition to cost
savings of nearly $120 million. The glass, in other words, is still
more than half full. In short, overlooking the tax compliance
87

BOE, Revenue Estimates (cited in note 72). In earlier studies, the BOE estimated

the tax gap was as high as 27 percent. Alamar, Mahmoud, and Glantz, Research and
Education at 7 (cited in note 72) (reporting BOE's earlier estimates). At least one (protax) group, however, has criticized the BOE's earlier estimates as overly pessimistic. Id at
20 (suggesting gap due to smuggling is only 14.2 percent).
88 All three estimates are taken from Stehr, 24 J Health Econ at 280 (cited in note
72) (estimating the national average tax gap at 7.2 percent in 1985, 12.7 percent in 2001,
and 9.6 percent across 1985-2001).
89 The Washington state tax gap estimate is from Smith and Huynh (cited in note
72). Smith and Huynh indicate that Washington imposed a tax of $1.60 per pack (on
average) in 2004 and the average price of a pack in the state was $4.68. Id at 31 n 27, 33
tbl Al, 37. Using these figures, the state tax rate would be 52 percent of the (pre-tax)
retail price. The federal government imposed an additional $.37 per-pack excise tax at the
time, bringing the combined tax rate to nearly 73 percent.
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issue is a costly mistake, but not one that would likely affect the
fate of the legalization and taxation proposals.

Proposals to tax marijuana distribution are generating a
buzz in California; by some estimates, a tax would generate $1.4
billion in new revenues for the beleaguered state. Notably, however, the leading estimate of the tax's revenue impact has altogether ignored the potential for evasion. The tax gives marijuana
distributors an obvious incentive to cheat. California could deter
evasion by maintaining high expected sanctions (p * S > T), but
doing so is easier said than done. The state would probably need
to monitor marijuana distribution through a closed licensing system. Other options, like increasing gross sanctions, seem infeasible. The licensing system California has proposed should help
weed out evasion, but it is no panacea. A portion of marijuana
consumption will escape taxation. Decades of experience with
cigarette taxes could help gauge the marijuana tax gap. On average, the tax gap for cigarettes runs between 7.2 percent and 24
percent. A similar gap range for the marijuana tax would cost
California $100-$332 million, but the proposal would still generate substantial revenues of $1.050-$1.286 billion (if the under
lying BOE estimates are correct).
III. INCENTIVES UNDER FEDERAL LAW

The above analysis assumed a unitary system, that is, a marijuana market governed only by state law. This Part adds another layer of complexity and realism by considering how federal
law changes distributors' incentives. Once federal law is considered, tax evasion becomes a much bigger concern and the tax
proposal loses much more of its luster.
Federal law bans the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana. 90 Though the federal government has repeatedly dismissed calls to decriminalize marijuana outright, the
Obama Administration has recently assumed a more tolerant
stance towards medicinal uses of marijuana. In particular,
Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the
Department of Justice ("DOJ') will no longer target distribution
of medical marijuana. 91 The Administration, however, remains
90 21 USC § 841(a)(1).
91 David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney General, Memorandum for Selected United
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steadfastly committed to enforcing the federal ban on recreational marijuana (a bigger market).9 2 Thus, anyone who possesses,
cultivates, or distributes recreational marijuana, even pursuant
to state law, remains subject to harsh federal sanctions. 93 (For
example, distribution of any quantity of marijuana carries a pos94
sible five-year prison term and $1 million fine. )
This Part provides the first in-depth analysis of the unique
issues posed by state taxation of federal crime. Section A sets the
necessary foundation by discussing preemption and the legal status of state taxation. Section B discusses the federal ban's impact
on the structure of the marijuana market. And Section C discusses the federal ban's effect on state monitoring. Section D
concludes by reevaluating estimates of the marijuana tax gap in
light of the special hurdles posed by federal law.
A.

Preemption

Before discussing whether California's proposal would satisfy its considerable promise ($44 $1.2 billion!), it seems prudent
to discuss whether California could constitutionally legalize and
tax something Congress expressly forbids. After all, if preempted
by federal law, the California reforms would be null and void, in
other words, unenforceable ($1.4 $1.2 billion! $0).
As it stands, federal law does permit California to legalize
(under state law) and tax marijuana. By congressional designand constitutional limitation-the Controlled Substances Act 95
("CSA") preempts state law only to the extent it positively conflicts with the federal ban. In a nutshell, this means a state may
not 1) engage in or 2) aid and abet conduct banned by the CSA
(that is, the possession, distribution, or production of marijuana).96 California's proposal passes muster because it does neither
of these things. First, the state itself would not produce or disStates Attorneys (Oct 19, 2009), online at http//blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192 (visited
Aug 27, 2010).
92 Carrie Johnson, U.S. Eases Stance on Medical Marijuana,Wash Post Al (Oct 20,
2009) (noting that Obama Administration has "stopped far short" of endorsing outright
legalization of marijuana).
93 See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuanaand the
States' Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 Vand L Rev 1421, 1435 (2009)
(detailing federal sanctions for the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana).
94 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(D).
95 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-513,
84 Stat 1236 (1970), codified as amended at 21 USC §§ 801-971.
96 I have explained the preemption analysis of state drug law reforms in great detail
elsewhere. Mikos, 62 Vand L Rev at 1450-52 (cited in note 93).
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tribute marijuana; rather, it would merely allow its residents to
do so, unimpeded by state sanctions. (Of course, the state could
more easily and effectively control marijuana if it were allowed
to grow and distribute the drug itself; after all, state ownership
of alcohol establishments contributed to the states' ability to impose controls on alcohol immediately following Prohibition's repeal. 97) Second, California would not aid and abet others who
98
produce and distribute marijuana, in the legally relevant sense.
In other words, it would not subsidize private production and
distribution of marijuana. Indeed, the state marijuana tax would,
if anything, curb CSA violations by raising the cost of marijuana.
California's power to legalize marijuana is protected by the
anti-commandeering rule. That rule blocks Congress from simply
forcing California to ban marijuana.9 9 However, that protection
is somewhat limited, for the anti-commandeering rule does not
block Congress from 1) bribing California to forego legalization or
even 2) forcing California to scrap the marijuana tax. As to the
former (bribe California), the anti-commandeering rule does not
curb Congress's conditional spending power, since states can (ostensibly) decline federal grants. Thus, in theory Congress could
offer California federal grants ($474 $1.2 billion!) on the condition
that California maintain its criminal ban on marijuana. As to the
latter (scrap just the tax), the anti-commandeering rule is not
implicated by congressional field preemption, that is, by wiping
out all state regulation of a given field in Congress's expansive
domain. Thus, in theory Congress could preempt California's tax
on marijuana (a form of regulation), even though it could not
preempt California's legalization of the drug (a form of nonregulation).' 0 0

97 Harry G. Levine and Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons
from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69 Milbank Q 461, 473-82 (1991) (suggesting that
one of the primary means of controlling alcohol once Prohibition was repealed was
through state ownership of retail distribution).
98 California would merely tolerate violations of federal law by its citizens, something
it is entitled to do under the anti-commandeering rule. See Mikos, 62 Vand L Rev at
1445-50 (cited in note 93), for an in-depth explanation.
99 See Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 935 (1995); New York v United States, 505
US 144, 188 (1992). See also Mikos, 62 Vand L Rev at 1445-50 (cited in note 93) (explaining why the anti-commandeering rule empowers states to legalize private activity that
Congress proscribes).
100 As I have explained elsewhere, the distinction is best explained by reference to the
state of nature. A tax departs from the state of nature and is thus preemptable; legalization merely restores the state of nature and is thus not preemptable. Mikos, 62 Vand L
Rev at 1445-50 (cited in note 93) (developing the state-of-nature benchmark).
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As a practical matter, however, Congress seems unlikely to
pass legislation aimed at blocking California's proposed reforms.
First, there is substantial public support for marijuana legalization. A recent poll shows that 45 percent of Americans now favor
legalization, versus 54 percent who favor prohibition 0 -not a
majority, but probably enough to thwart anti-legalization measures (for example, conditional grants) in Congress.1 0 2 Second,
preempting a state marijuana tax represents a serious gamble
for drug hawks, since California might legalize marijuana anyway, even if could not tax the drug. 10 3 Given that the federal government's own drug enforcement resources are quite limited,
drug hawks would probably prefer that California impose some
sanction on marijuana (that is, a tax) than no sanction at all.
B.

Market Structure

Though the federal government would probably allow the
states to legalize and tax marijuana, its continuing ban on marijuana would impair enforcement of a state marijuana tax for two
reasons: 1) it would preserve the current fragmented structure of
the marijuana market, by giving marijuana distributors an incentive to remain small and to operate inconspicuously; and 2) it
would put state tax collectors in a dilemma, because federal authorities could use state tax rolls (and similar state-gathered information) to track down and punish tax-paying marijuana distributors. This Section discusses the structure of the marijuana
market and its implications for the enforcement of the proposed
marijuana tax. The next Section discusses federal law and the
dilemma it poses for state monitoring of marijuana distribution.

101 Gallup Poll, October 2009 (surveying national adult sample of 1,013 between Oct
1-4, 2009), online at http;//www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/dataaccess/lpolVipoll.htnl
(visited May 19, 2010).
102 For discussions of the political limits on the exercise of congressional power, see
generally Bradford R. Clark, Separationof Powers as a Safeguardof Federalism,29 Tex L
Rev 1321 (2001); Cindy D. Kam and Robert A. Mikos, Do Citizens Care about Federalism?
An Experimental Study, 4 J Empirical Legal Stud 589 (2007); Larry D. Kramer, Putting
the Politics Back into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum L Rev 215 (2000);
Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 Ohio St L J 1669 (2007);
Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954).
103 Interestingly, AB 390 preemptively adopts this posture-its tax provisions would
take effect only if the federal government legalized marijuana. See AB 390 at 4.
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1. The fragmented marijuana market.
As it stands, the marijuana market is highly fragmented; in
other words, there are many small producers and distributors.
Not surprisingly, the exact number of "firms" is unknown; however, law enforcement data suggest it is several thousands. In
2008, for example, law enforcement agents seized 2,455 marijuana grow sites in California. 10 4 Assuming this number represents
between 10-25 percent of all California grow sites, 10 5 and assuming that one grow site represents one firm, there would be anywhere from 10,000 to 25,000 firms operating illegally across the
state. 10 6 The fragmented structure of the legal medical marijuana
market in California lends some support to the high estimate. In
Los Angeles County alone, for example, there are more than
1,000 dispensaries that distribute medical marijuana; in other
words, it is now easier for patients to obtain cannabis than a
Frappucino or Big Mac. 107

2.

Why market structure matters.

California's ability to monitor marijuana distribution is severely constrained by the fragmentation of that market. Monitor104 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Domestic Cannabis Cultivation Assessment, 3
(2009), online at httpV/www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs37/37035findex.htm (visited Sept 30,
2010).
105 At one time, the DEA sought to estimate what portion of the market had been
eradicated, but its estimates-ranging from 30 percent to 50 percent, DEA, Domestic
Cannabis Cultivation Assessment, 13 (2007), online at httpV/www.justice.gov/ndic/
pubs22/22486fmdex.htm (visited Sept 30, 2010)-constituted mere guesswork and were
criticized as being overly optimistic (that is, too high). The DEA recently abandoned making such claims, DEA, Domestic CannabisCultivation Assessment (2009) (revealing that
the 2009 assessment did not attempt to estimate the percentage of marijuana eradicated),
but some state law enforcement officials suggest the figure may be only 1 percent, see
Fainaru and Booth, Cartels Face an Economic Battle at Al (cited in note 59) (reporting
that California sheriff estimates law enforcement captures only 1 percent of marijuana
grown in his county).
106 This is corroborated by anecdotal reports by law enforcement officials who suggest
that thousands of 'mom and pop' marijuana operations have sprung up to satisfy growing
demand for high-quality marijuana strains, displacing larger Mexican drug cartels. See
Fainaru and Booth, Cartels Face an Economic Battle (cited in note 59) ("Stiff competition
from thousands of mom-and-pop marijuana farmers in the United States threatens the
bottom line for powerful Mexican drug organizations.").
107 See Roger Parloff, How Pot Became Legal, Fortune Mag 156 (Sept 28, 2009) (reporting that medical marijuana dispensaries outnumber Starbucks and McDonald's locations combined in LA County). To be fair, state-imposed restrictions on dispensaries-for
example, cooperatives may only serve members-have probably helped fragment the
medical marijuana market. See Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Guidelines for the Security and
Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for Medical Use 8-11 (2008), online at http//ag.ca.
gov/cms-attachments/press/pdfs/nl601_medicalmarijuanaguidelines.pdf (visited Sept 30,
2010) (discussing guidelines concerning operation of marijuana cooperatives).
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ing thousands of growers and distributors would overwhelm the
state's limited enforcement capacity.108 Indeed, market structure
is one reason prohibition has been such a costly-and largely
futile-endeavor; despite investing billions annually, law enforcement agencies apprehend only a small fraction of all marijuana offenders (perhaps 10 percent). 0 9
Contrast the highly fragmented marijuana market with the
highly concentrated cigarette market. Three firms dominate cigarette production: Altria, R.J. Reynolds, and BAT/Brown &
Williamson in combination control more than 85 percent of that
market.'1 0 Although cigarette distributors are more numerous,
consolidation at the manufacturing stage greatly enhances government monitoring and taxation of distribution. Most importantly, it means government need not monitor individual distributors closely to figure out how much a given distributor sells;
rather, it can estimate sales (and tax burdens) by examining
manufacturers' sales records."' For example, if the government
examined Altria's accounts and found that Altria had sold 100
thousand cartons of cigarettes to Firm A, it could easily infer
Firm A's (probable) tax burden. If Firm A reports only 10 thousand cartons sold, government investigators would know to
target Firm A for audit. As suggested above, the industry's highly concentrated structure helps explain why the cigarette tax gap
remains tolerably low.
3.

The prospect of consolidation.

To be sure, one might expect the marijuana market to consolidate post-legalization. The alcohol industry sets a precedent
for such consolidation. During Prohibition, tens of thousands of
small distillers supplied spirits, largely unchecked by law enforcement. 112 In the decades following the repeal of Prohibition,
108 See Leitzel, Regulating Vice at 162-63 (cited in note 56) (discussing the need to
limit the number of vice vendors). The difficulty will be compounded by the fact that
marijuana can be grown inconspicuously-in basements, backyard gardens, and so onmeaning that all but the largest growers could easily conceal themselves from prying
eyes.
109 See Mikos, 62 Vand L Rev at 1463-69 (cited in note 93) (analyzing de facto limits
hampering prohibition policy).
110 Tan, 28 Rev Indust Org at 232 (cited in note 84) (data as of 2000).
111 For discussions of the procedures used to monitor cigarette distribution and collect
taxes, see, for example, General Accounting Office, Cigarette Smuggling at 3-4 (cited in
note 72).
112 Levine and Reinarman, 69 Milbank Q at 473-74 (cited in note 97) ("[I]n 1933 a
sprawling illegal industry for producing and distributing alcoholic beverages was in place,
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the market has become increasingly concentrated; by 2003, for
example, three firms together controlled more than 80 percent of
11 3
the beer market.
Similarly, various barriers to entry that enabled the cigarette market to become-and remain--consolidated could enable
the marijuana market to become consolidated as well. First,
there are enormous economies of scale to cigarette manufacturing. 11 4 Cigarette rolling machines significantly reduce the cost of
manufacture and increase the minimum efficient scale of firms.
In fact, scholars attribute the consolidation of the cigarette industry in part to the introduction of such machines in the late
1800s.115 Presumably, the production of marijuana joints, like the
production of cigarettes, could be mechanized as well. Such
mechanization would give larger growers and distributors a
competitive edge, eventually weeding out numerous smaller, less
11 6
efficient firms.

composed of uncountable numbers of small independent distributors and producers, and
some larger ones."). See also Leitzel, Regulating Vice at 111 (cited in note 56) (reporting
that federal agents seized 18,000 stills and 217,000 fermenters in 1928, suggesting that
law enforcement faced a daunting task but also enjoyed some success during Prohibition).
113 Kenneth Elzinga and Anthony Swisher, The Supreme Court and Beer Mergers:
From Pabst/Blatztothe DOJ-FTC Merger Guidelines, 26 Rev Indust Org 245, 246 (2005)
(also noting that in 1947, the top five firms controlled only 19 percent of the beer market);
see also Victor J. Tremblay and Carol Horton Tremblay, The U.S. Brewing Industry: Data
and Economic Analysis 41 (2005) (noting that the number of independent beer producers
declined from 421 to 22 between 1947 and 2002).
114 Malcolm R. Burns, Economies of Scale in Tobacco Manufacturing 189 7-1910, 43 J
Econ Hist 461, 462 (1983) ("It is well-established that the invention of rolling machines
created substantial economies of scale in the manufacture of cigarettes between 1890 and
1910."); Frank J. Chaloupka, Cigarettes:Old Firms Facing New Challenges, in Victor J.
Tremblay and Carol H. Tremblay, eds, Industry and Firm Studies at 81 (4th ed 2007)
(discussing economies of scale advantage gained by early adopters of cigarette rolling
machines); Patrick G. Porter, Originsof the American Tobacco Company, 43 Bus Hist Rev
59, 69 (1969) ("The [cigarette rolling] machines brought about a tremendous reduction in
the cost of manufacturing."); Eric W. Zitzewitz, Competition and Long-Run Productivity
in the UK and US Tobacco Industries, 1879-1939, 51 J Indus Econ 1, 18 (2003). ("Mechanization dramatically reduced direct labor requirements; the 1883 Bonsack machine
produced 8,000 to 10,000 cigarettes per hour compared with the 250 by hour that could be
rolled by hand.").
115 For a thorough examination of the history of and factors behind the consolidation
of the cigarette industry, see generally Porter, 43 Bus Hist Rev 59 (cited in note 114)
(concluding that mechanization, patents, and anti-competitive practices contributed to
consolidation).
116 See Bates, Economic Implications in Alaska at 30 (cited in note 26) ("Were marijuana to be grown commercially, with industrial methods utilizing scale economies, ...
small operations [that currently dominate the market] would be almost completely supplanted. This in turn would facilitate tax collection, so long as the tax is not so exorbitant
as to keep production in the black market."); Kenneth W. Clements and Xueyan Zhao,
Economics and Marijuana:Consumption, Pricing,and Legalisation 323 (2009) (suggesting marijuana could take advantage of large-scale production, like cigarettes, if legalized).
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Second, there is strong brand loyalty among consumers in
the cigarette market. 117 Strong brand loyalty, built up through
substantial firm investments in advertising, helps explains why
new cigarette firms cannot easily capture market share from the
entrenched firms. 118 Namely, it would take enormous investments to dislodge customers from their existing brands. It seems
plausible that commercial marijuana firms could cultivate similar brand loyalty, which would enable them eventually to consolidate market share.
To be sure, the marijuana market might never achieve the
same level of consolidation as the alcohol or cigarette markets.
For example, the comparative ease of producing marijuana could
enable smaller producers (including many users) to survive in
the marijuana market. And, in any event, it could take years for
the above-mentioned forces to consolidate the marijuana market. 1 19 In other words, the tax gap could be especially large at the
outset, that is, when California needs the revenue most. But one
could reasonably suppose that over time, only a few firms would
survive in a truly legal marijuana market. If so, the task of collecting the marijuana tax would be made much simpler.
4.

How the federal ban blocks consolidation.

California, however, does not have the power to lift prohibition writ large, only state prohibition. Marijuana would remain
criminal under federal law. And for at least two reasons, the fed120
eral ban would impede consolidation of the marijuana market.
117 Chaloupka, Cigarettes at 97-99 (cited in note 114) ("Cigarettes enjoy extremely
high rates of brand loyalty among smokers.").
118 Id (suggesting that heavy investments in marketing, coupled with government
restrictions on advertising, raised cost of entry and thereby contributed to concentration
of cigarette manufacturing industry).
119 The alcoholic beverage and cigarette markets seem to have consolidated in a few
short years, once certain forces-the repeal of Prohibition and introduction of cigarette
rolling machines-were put in play. See Levine and Reinarman, 69 Milbank Q at 477
(cited in note 97) (discussing consolidation of distilled alcohol industry following repeal of
Prohibition in 1933 and noting that by end of 1930s, four firms had captured 80 percent of
market); see generally Zitzewitz, 51 J Indust Econ 1 (cited in note 114) (discussing consolidation of cigarette market brought on by mechanization of the manufacturing process in
late 1800s).
120 In addition to hampering consolidation of the market, federal law would also tend
to keep the marijuana market underground, again, where it is harder to observe. Observing 1,000 distributors (as opposed to 10) is difficult enough. Observing 1,000 distributors
who do not advertise themselves is even more difficult.
To be sure, there would be some advantages to operating openly-which would
ease tax collection. Some customers would prefer buying from a dealer who complies with
(state) law. But firms that operate in plain sight of customers also operate in plain sight
of state tax collectors and federal law enforcement authorities.
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First, the federal ban creates a strong disincentive for distributors to grow big. Compared to smaller distributors, larger
distributors are more likely to be caught and punished by federal
authorities. 12 1 Every drug transaction conducted by a distributor
carries a distinct risk of detection. To be sure, the risk probably
declines with every transaction, since the distributor who evades
detection once probably acquires knowledge that could help her
evade detection again. At the same time, however, the consequences of being caught escalate with every transaction, since
the detection of one transaction could reveal others. For example,
if authorities catch D distributing marijuana once, they might
search D's home; in the course of the search, the authorities
1 22
might discover evidence of previously undetected transactions.
In the ensuing plea deal (or trial), D would be punished for all of
the offenses, boosting the effective sanction for the nth transaction.
In a related vein, if caught, a larger distributor is more likely to be prosecuted and punished. The United States Attorneys
(USAs) have wide latitude to decide what cases to pursue. And
when it comes to marijuana offenses, some USAs decline to pursue cases unless they involve substantial quantities of the drug.
Many United States Attorneys' Offices have set this threshold at
200 pounds or more. 123 To be sure, the USA can ignore these
guidelines; but their very existence suggests a reluctance (or
perhaps inability) to expend resources chasing down mom-andpop marijuana operations. The CSA's graduated penalty schedule provides added incentive for USAs to focus on cases involving
substantial quantities; for example, cases involving more than
100 kilograms trigger mandatory sentences of five years imprisonment and fines up to $10 million, and those figures are doubled for cases involving 1,000 kilograms or more.1 24 A marijuana
distributor might choose to forgo the benefits of expansion (for
121 For my purposes, distributor size is based on the number of transactions (bigger
distributors engage in more), rather than the quantities involved in them.
122 The consequences of being caught increase, even though the discrete probability of
being caught falls. At some point, the former effect outweighs the latter; this point helps
determine the optimal size for any distributor.
123 Howie Padilla and Paul Gustafson, Not Prosecuting Pot Case Baffles Some
Authorities, Star Trib B1 (Feb 21, 2007) (reporting that the DEA does not bring a marijuana case to the Minnesota United States Attorney unless it involves more than 500
pounds); James Pinkerton and Susan Carroll, As Border Emphasis Changes, Drug Cases
Show Drop, Houston Chron Al (Apr 14, 2007) (reporting that the Arizona USA refers
cases involving less than 500 pounds of marijuana to state authorities).
124 21 USC § 841(b)(1).
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example, economies of scale) in order to avoid detection and
125
prosecution by federal authorities.
Second, federal laws impede distributors' ability to build
brand names and consolidate market share. The federal Lanham
Act bars the registration of a trademark used on any product
proscribed by federal law, including marijuana. 126 For similar
reasons, federal law would presumably bar common law protection of an unregistered trademark on marijuana. 127 Hence, a distributor that wanted to expand its market share by building a
brand name could not seek federal protection of its trademark. 128
Suppose, for example, that D, our distributor, develops a new
strand of marijuana she labels "Acapulco Gold." D could not easily capture the benefits of her development. If her new strain becomes a hit, other distributors could exploit the name "Acapulco
Gold" to push their own (inferior) products. D could not sue for
125 There is also a related disincentive to being the biggest fish, because smaller fish
can arrange lenient plea deals with prosecutors for frying their larger brethren.
126 To register a trademark, the owner must demonstrate actual use in commerce or
bona fide intent to use. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a)(3)(C). The use in commerce requirement
poses two problems for marijuana distributors. First, courts and the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") have interpreted it to mean lawful use in commerce, making it
impossible to satisfy as long as marijuana distribution remains illegal under federal law.
See, for example, United Phosphorusv Midland Fumigant,205 F3d 1219, 1225 (10th Cir
2000) ("[Slhipping goods in violation of federal law cannot qualify as the 'use in commerce'
necessary to establish trademark rights."). See also 8-900 Gilson on Trademarks 907
(2009) (Matthew Bender 2009) ("Use of a mark in commerce must be lawful use to be the
basis for federal registration of the mark."). Second, in any event, a distributor would
admit to a federal crime-in a federal court no less-by attesting to having sold marijuana in commerce. Such an admission could expose the owner to federal criminal and civil
sanctions.
The PTO recently considered recognizing trademarks on medicinal marijuana
products, but it quickly abandoned the idea. Justin Scheck, Patent Office Raises High
Hopes, Then Snuffs Them Out, Wall St J Al (Jul 19, 2010).
127 To obtain common law protection of a trademark, the owner would need to demonstrate use in commerce; in so doing, she would presumably encounter the same problems
discussed above concerning registration of the mark. For a discussion of trademark rights
conferred by common law, see 1-3 Gilson on Trademarks at § 3.02 (cited in note 126)
("Actual use of most kinds of trademarks, without more, establishes protectible trademark rights under common law.").
128 It is, of course, possible that the distributor could seek protection of her brand
under state trademark (or unfair competition) law, but such protection would arguably be
preempted by federal law. To be sure, federal trademark law-the Lanham Act-probably
would not preempt state protection of a trademark on marijuana goods; however, the CSA
probably would preempt state protection, because state protection of a trademark on
marijuana goods arguably generates a "positive conflict" with the CSA. See 21 USC § 903
(preempting state laws that generate a "positive conflict" with the CSA). As I have explained elsewhere, a positive conflict arises under the CSA when a state takes any action
that violates the CSA. Mikos, 62 Vand L Rev at 1452 (cited in note 93). By protecting the
trademark of a marijuana distributor, a state would arguably "aid and abet" the distribution of marijuana, in clear violation of the CSA. Id at 1445-60 (discussing in detail the
CSA's preemption of state law).
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trademark infringement (in federal court, anyway), so any money
spent building the brand name would be lost. Lacking the means
to differentiate their products through branding, marijuana distributors and producers could not achieve the high concentration
seen in the cigarette market.
In short, the federal ban would frustrate California's monitoring of marijuana distribution by preventing consolidation of
the marijuana market. The federal ban on marijuana gives firms
an incentive to stay small, and, in any event, hampers attempts
to grow via branding. To detect tax evasion, California would
need to adopt costly enforcement measures (for example, random
129
audits) that may not yield positive returns.
C.

The Monitoring Dilemma

Even supposing, arguendo, that California could find a way
to observe marijuana distribution (for example, via licensing), it
would not be out of the woods yet, for the federal ban creates another, even more daunting problem: federal law enforcement
could use California's monitoring system to track down and sanction marijuana distributors who obey state law.
Monitoring marijuana distribution creates a long paper trail.
If successful, a state licensing or tax administration system
would reveal the name, place of business, and sales of every marijuana distributor in the state. Such data may be needed for enforcing a state tax, but it could also be used to help enforce the
federal ban. Federal law enforcement agents could seize the data
and there is nothing the states can do to stop them.
First, the states cannot shield distributors from federal sanctions. Although states may "legalize" marijuana distribution for
130
purposes of state law, they cannot eliminate federal sanctions.
Second, states cannot necessarily conceal data from federal authorities, even when that data is privileged under state law. As I
argue elsewhere, federal statutory privileges, the anti129 My colleague, Paul Edelman, has suggested an ingenious strategy to incentivize
consolidation-reduce the tax rate for larger distributors. To some extent, the fixed fee for
a marijuana distribution license would serve this purpose, though it seems California has
no interest in limiting the number of licenses or in setting the fee ($5,000 at first, declining to $2,500) high enough to spur consolidation. See AB 390 (cited in note 8).
Importantly, however, California cannot force consolidation on the market, for
example, by restricting the number of licenses, because it would not squarely address one
force that would continue to drive fragmentation: the federal ban.
130 Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 29-33 (2005) (holding that California medical marijuana law does not bar federal prosecution). See also Mikos, 68 Vand L Rev at 1463 (cited in
note 93) (explaining why state medical marijuana laws do not bind federal authorities).
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commandeering
rule, and the privilege
against selfincrimination, among other legal doctrines, provide only limited
protection for sensitive information states require citizens to re131
port.
As a consequence, marijuana distributors could be made
worse off by obeying state law. To be sure, distributors could be
prosecuted by federal authorities regardless of whether they pay
the state tax; however, the probability they would be detected by
federal authorities goes up dramatically if they do so-the federal government simply would not have the resources to track
down any but the largest marijuana distributors without using a
state database. 13 2 Of course, evading state taxes carries a risk as
well; a distributor who does so faces state punishment if caught.
But a drug distributor might still find it worthwhile to face this
risk (it is only a risk) rather than face near certain (and very
large) sanctions that could be imposed by the federal government
upon paying the state tax.
Simply put, to the extent expected federal sanctions increase
by paying the state tax, distributors are given added incentive to
evade the tax. Ironically, the better information states gather,
the worse off they (or drug distributors) become. Even if marijuana distributors would rationally choose to pay the state tax in
the absence of the federal regime, they may opt to evade the tax
in the presence of the federal regime. Marijuana tax proponents
133
have overlooked this threat.
131 Mikos, CommandeeringStates' Secrets (cited in note 16) (explaining why the anticommandeering rule, privilege against self-incrimination, and federal evidentiary privileges provide at best limited protection for state confidences).
132 See Mikos, 62 Vand L Rev at 1463-69 (cited in note 93) (discussing practical limits
on federal police power in marijuana cases).
133 Reconsider the standard depiction of evasion incentives: a distributor would evade
tax (T) if it exceeds the expected legal sanctions (p * S). The federal ban adds a new sanction to the mix (Sf), unlike the state sanction for tax evasion (Ss), Sf may be imposed
regardless of whether T is paid-it is, after all, a sanction for marijuana distribution. In
fact, as this Section has demonstrated, it seems more likely that Sf would be imposed if T
is paid because federal authorities have an easier time identifying distributors who pay
the tax than those who evade it. If we assume, at the extreme, that every tax-paying
distributor would also incur the federal sanction, the expected cost of the tax is now T +
Sf. The federal ban also increases the cost of evading the state tax, but not by as much.
Realistically, the federal government cannot detect many marijuana distributors without
the assistance of state law enforcement-its resources are too limited. Suppose the state
and federal authorities cooperate in tracking down tax evading distributors; the joint
probability of detection is p, where p < 1. The cost of evasion is thus p * (Ss + Sf). Under
various assumptions, a distributor who would be willing to pay the state tax in the absence of the federal ban would find it worthwhile to evade the tax once the federal ban is
implemented. In particular, evasion looks more appealing, ceteris parabis: 1) the smaller
is p; 2) the smaller is Ss compared to T; and 3) more interestingly, for present purposes,
the larger is Sf relative to Ss.
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The Tax Gap (Version 2)

Given the persistence of the federal prohibition on marijuana, comparing the proposed marijuana tax to the tax on a legal
vice like cigarettes seems less appropriate. A more fitting
benchmark for assessing the marijuana tax gap could be, well,
the marijuana tax gap.
Twenty-one states have laws on the books that tax the sale
of marijuana (and other illicit drugs). 134 In these states, however,
the drug remains prohibited. The tax merely supplements the
criminal and various other civil sanctions these states impose on
the cultivation, distribution, and possession of marijuana.
Unfortunately for California, such taxes on illicit drugs are
135
seldom paid and generate correspondingly paltry revenue.
Until recently, for example, the state of Tennessee imposed a tax
on possession of all illicit drugs-the rate was set at $3.50 per
gram for marijuana. 136 Nonetheless, the state collected only $10
million total over four years. 137 The state of Oklahoma, which has
a similar tax, 138 has fared even worse-it collected only $80 in
tax year 2005-2006.139
It is easy to see why states have done poorly when it comes
to collecting taxes on illicit substances. As discussed above, prohibition gives drug distributors ample incentive to hide from law
enforcement authorities-this hinders monitoring that is necessary for effective collection of civil taxes. Proponents had hoped
that by legalizing marijuana, California could reap significantly
more tax revenues than are generated by extant taxes on illicit
134 Waters v Farr,291 SW3d 873, 884-85 (Tenn 2009) (surveying state taxes on illegal
substances and noting that taxes in all but eleven states have been found unenforceable
on federal or state constitutional grounds). See also NORML, State Tax Stamp Data,
online at http/nornil.org/index.cfm?Group-ID=6668 (visited Oct 3, 2010) (providing
useful information on the content and status of state taxes on illicit drugs).
135 See Leitzel, Regulating Vice at 158 (cited in note 56) (noting that many states
already tax marijuana, though few dealers actually pay these taxes); Miron, Budgetary
Implications at Appendix (cited in note 26) (estimating revenue generated from fines and
forfeitures in drug-related cases).
136 West's Term Code Ann §67-4-2803 (specifying tax rate).
137 Tennessee Tax on Illegal Drugs Ruled Unconstitutional,Associated Press (July 24,
2009) (reporting that the state Supreme Court found state law exceeded legislatures'
enumerated tax powers under state constitution). What is more, much of that revenue
that has been collected has actually come from stamp collectors (the state provides a
stamp when the tax is paid), as opposed to drug dealers. Id.
138 68 Okl St Ann § 450.2 (specifying tax rate).
139 Oklahoma Tax Commission, Annual Report at 12 (2006), online at http;//www.tax.
ok.gov/publicat/AR2006.pdf (visited Oct 3, 2010) (reporting revenue from sale of controlled dangerous substances tax stamps).
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drugs. In essence, the hope-or assumption-is that marijuana
distribution would consolidate and come out into the open, enabling civil taxation and regulation to occur. The problem is that
the federal ban mitigates the differences between California's
proposed tax and extant marijuana taxes in prohibition states.
To be sure, state legalization is likely to make some difference.
Some consolidation could occur-and some marijuana distributors would operate in the open, because the federal government's
law enforcement resources are limited. 140 But it seems likely marijuana will remain a predominantly black market so long as federal prohibition-and some willingness to enforce it-remains in
place. California may be able to decriminalize-even legalizemarijuana, but it cannot necessarily regulate the drug effectively. Hence, California could face a much steeper gap than anticipated above in Part I(C). In fact, the state might collect only a
small fraction of taxes due, a realization that substantially diminishes the financial appeal of the proposals currently under
consideration.
CONCLUSION

This Article has examined a proposed state marijuana tax to
highlight previously ignored tax compliance problems states face
when attempting to tax goods or services that are forbidden under federal law. Due largely to the strains caused by the recession and attendant fiscal crises, several states are seriously contemplating legalizing and taxing marijuana. The financial allure
is enormous-policymakers and economists suggest that a marijuana tax could generate billions in new revenues for the states.
The federal ban on marijuana, however, complicates enforcement of the tax. In particular, the federal ban makes state
monitoring of marijuana distribution especially difficult and potentially self-defeating. First, the federal ban will keep the marijuana market fragmented. This means that thousands of small
growers and distributors will continue to compete on the marijuana market, potentially overwhelming limited state tax collection
resources. Second, even assuming a state could find a way to
track taxable marijuana sales, doing so would only create a new
problem. Federal law enforcement agents could use this stategathered information to impose harsh federal sanctions on taxpaying marijuana distributors. The threat of being exposed in
140 Mikos, 62 Vand L Rev at 1463-69 (cited in note 93) (detailing federal government's
inability to effectively enforce its marijuana ban).
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state records gives marijuana distributors an additional incentive-above and beyond the state tax-to evade state tax authorities. For both reasons, the continuing federal ban on marijuana
is likely to exacerbate a marijuana tax gap. The states might collect only a fraction of the revenues proponents now claim a tax
would generate.
There is no obvious solution to the problems posed by the
federal ban, short of federal legalization. Many of the steps states
could normally take to enhance tax compliance would be stymied
or preempted by federal law. A state, for example, could not sell
marijuana at state-operated stores; this option is clearly
preempted by the CSA, which bars states-no less than private
citizens-from distributing the drug. A state could attempt to
foster consolidation of the marijuana market-for example, by
limiting the number of licenses it issues or by imposing a lower
tax rate on larger distributors-but doing so would not relieve
distributors' fears of getting caught in the crosshairs of federal
prosecutors. Allowing distributors to pay the tax anonymously
would eliminate the paper trail for federal authorities, but it
seems unlikely to deter tax evasion-existing drug taxes are paid
anonymously and generate paltry revenues. The most promising
reform could be to focus on taxing medical marijuana. The federal government's announcement that it would halt enforcement of
the federal ban on medical marijuana would seemingly pave the
way for consolidation of this niche market and would remove the
concern that federal agents would use state gathered information
against medical marijuana distributors.1 4 1 A tax on this niche
market, however, would generate only a fraction of the revenues
now being touted by tax proponents. What is more, singling out
medical marijuana for taxation could prove politically unpalatable; indeed, many state lawmakers are considering exempting
medical marijuana from any marijuana tax.
In sum, as long as federal law proscribes marijuana-and
federal agents remain committed to enforcing the ban-a state
tax on marijuana would be largely unsuccessful. The tax would
not force marijuana users to internalize the social costs of their
activity; nor would it be a panacea for state budget woes. There
141 The state could encourage payment of a medical marijuana tax by giving consumers an incentive to report taxable transactions. For example, a state could impose a tax on
marijuana distributors of $140 per ounce; it could then offer consumers a tax rebate of
$70 per ounce, on condition that they report their purchases. These reports could then be
compared against sales reports made by distributors. I am grateful to Amitai Aviram for
the suggestion.
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are reasonable arguments favoring legalization of marijuana;
rescuing the states from dire fiscal straits, however, is not one of
them.

